Administrative Suspension

An elected official may be meted the penalty of suspension in an administrative case where he has been found guilty of misconduct. But suppose that, in the meantime that the case was pending, the elected official’s term of office expired, and he was re-elected to another term. Does the suspension order issued during his expired term automatically apply to a new term to which the official may have been reelected?

Plain common sense dictates that there could be no such automatic application or extension of the suspension order to a new term to which the official was reelected. If the official had not run for reelection or if he had lost in his bid for reelection, the suspension order would have lapsed and become functus officio by virtue of the expiration of his term. He would no longer have any office from which he would remain suspended, or to which he could be reinstated after expiration of the suspension. So, it is clear that suspension can refer only to the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed.

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Indeed, if the official had run for an entirely new office (say, he was a vice-mayor, and he was elected in the succeeding election as mayor), it could not be contended that the suspension order (from office as vice-mayor) would automatically attach to this entirely new office as mayor. Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said. One just cannot overrule the voice of the people which elected him to a new office.

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More than 50 years ago, the Supreme Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 406 (1959) issued the landmark ruling that prohibits the disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act committed during his immediately preceding term of office. The Court explained that "[t]he underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor."

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Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. 123 Phil. 916 (1966) replicated the doctrine. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition in that case for being moot, the therein petitioner "having been duly reelected, is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions." (Id. at 919). Consistently, the Supreme Court has reiterated the doctrine in a string of jurisprudence including two cases involving a Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives. (Vide Office of the Ombudsman v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 177211, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 350, 361; Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 471, 488; Cabrera v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 157419-20, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 207, 216-217; People v. Judge Toledano, 387 Phil. 957, 964 [2000]; People v. Jalosjos, 381 Phil. 690, 702-703 [2000]).

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Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 326 Phil. 847 (1996) reinforced the doctrine. Citing sound public policy, the Supreme Court added that to rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between the reelected official and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts allegedly committed during his prior term, such that his second term may thus be devoted to defending himself in those cases to the detriment of public service. Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica, 372 Phil. 892 (1999) further explained the doctrine of condonation. Here, the Supreme Court stated that there is the presumption that the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character, precisely to eliminate the need to determine in factual terms the extent of this knowledge, which is an obviously impossible undertaking. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official’s culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.

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Take note, however, that the discussions above refer only to suspension as an administrative penalty. Preventive suspension of an elected official after a criminal case has been filed against him is different. It is not a penalty because it is imposed at a time before the official has been found guilty of the crime. Its purpose is "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other evidence." It is a means to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. This mode of preventive suspension is not affected by reelection.

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